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ARGUMENT 
Crown Asphalt Products Co. ("CAPCO") incorrectly argues that (1) Frehner 
Construction Co. ("Frehner") relied upon the improper Nevada statutory venue provision 
and (2) that there is a factual dispute over whether the parties had contracted for a Nevada 
venue. These arguments are misguided for the reasons set forth below. 
I. THE STATUTORY VENUE PROVISION IN NRS § 339.055 GOVERNS 
ALL PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS. 
A. NRS § 408.363 Does Not Contain a Statutory Venue Provision. 
Where two statutes conflict, the more specific statute will govern over the more 
general statute. See Williams v. Public Service Comm % 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988); 
see also Gaines v. State of Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 170 (Nev. 2000). CAPCO incorrectly 
asserts that NRS § 408.363 more specifically describes venue requirements than does 
NRS § 339.055. NRS § 408.363 reads: 
Claims against contractor's bond, action against surety. 
1. Any person who has furnished labor, materials, provisions, 
implements, machinery, means of transportation or supplies used or 
consumed by such contractor or his or its subcontractors in or about the 
performance of the work contracted to be done, and whose claim therefor 
has not been paid by such contractor or subcontractors, and who desires to 
be protected under the bond, shall file with the Department a claim in 
triplicate within 30 days from the date of final acceptance of the contract as 
provided in NRS 408.387, and such claim shall be executed and verified 
before a notary public and contain a statement that the same has not been 
paid. One copy shall be filed in the office of the Department and the 
remaining copies shall be forwarded to the contractor and surety. 
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2. Any such person so filing a claim may at any time within 6 
months thereafter commence an action against the surety or sureties on the 
bond for the recovery of the amount of the claim and the filing of such 
claims shall not constitute a claim against the Department. Failure to 
commence such action upon the bond and the sureties within 6 months after 
date of the Department's final acceptance will bar any right of action 
against such surety or sureties. 
See NRS § 408.363. This statute does not contain a statutory venue provision. It cannot 
address venue more specifically than the statutory venue provision for all public works 
projects found in NRS § 339.055 because it does not address venue at all. While NRS § 
408.363 more fully describes the activity involved in the Boulder Highway Project, it 
does not contain a statutory venue provision. 
CAPCO does not argue that NRS § 408.363 contains a statutory venue provision. 
It argues instead that NRS § 408.363 does not contain the venue selection language -
"shall be brought in the appropriate court of the political subdivision where the contract 
for which the bond was given was to be performed" - from NRS § 339.055. There is no 
need for NRS § 408.363 to contain this language because the statutory venue provision in 
NRS § 339.055 covers all public works. 
B. NRS § 408.363 Does Not Supercede the Statutory Venue Provision in § 
339.055. 
NRS § 339.055 is a statutory venue provision that applies to bonds involving all 
public works projects in Nevada. It states: 
1. Every action on a payment bond as provided in NRS 339.035 
shall be brought in the appropriate court of the political subdivision where 
the contract for which the bond was given was to be performed. 
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NRS § 339.055. NRS § 339.055 applies to "any claimant who has performed labor or 
furnished material in the prosecution of the work provided for in any contract for which a 
payment bond has been given pursuant to the provisions of subsection 1 of NRS 
339.025." See NRS § 339.035. NRS § 339.025(1) in turn requires contractors to furnish 
performance and payment bonds "[b]efore any contract, except one subject to the 
provisions of chapter 408 of NRS, exceeding $35,000 for any project for the new 
construction, repair or reconstruction of any public building or other public work or 
public improvement of any contracting body is awarded to any contractor." NRS § 
339.025. 
Although NRS § 339.025 specifically excludes Chapter 408, it deals with bonding 
requirements, not bonding disputes. The Nevada legislature specifically instituted a 
statutory venue provision in NRS § 339.055 to govern all bonding disputes arising from 
public works projects. The construction of highways, roads and transportation facilities 
are public works projects. NRS § 408.363 provides special requirements for filing claims 
relating to highways, roads and transportation facilities with the transportation 
department, but it contains no language that supercedes the statutory venue provision in 
NRS § 339.055 that applies to all public works projects. 
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C. Upholding the Statutory Venue Provision in NRS § 339.055 Will Provide 
the Most Efficient Resolution of the Dispute. 
Courts have considered factors such as the proximity of witnesses and evidence to 
the place of trial in upholding forum selection clauses that require litigation over bonding 
to occur in the jurisdiction where the construction took place. See St. Paul Fire and' 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 401 F. Supp. 927 930 (D. Mass. 1975) 
(Citations omitted). In this case, the construction occurred in Nevada, the witnesses are 
located in Nevada and the relevant evidence is located in Nevada. Allowing this dispute 
to proceed in Nevada will provide the most economic and efficient resolution. 
II. CAPCO CONTRACTED WITH FREHNER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES IN 
NEVADA. 
Frehner explicitly rejected CAPCO's original offer and then made a valid 
counteroffer, which included a forum selection clause, that CAPCO accepted. CAPCO's 
attempt to manufacture a factual issue concerning its consent to the forum selection 
clause in Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order Form ignores the clear facts. 
A. Frehner Rejected Capco Js Offer and Made a Valid Counteroffer. 
In Utah, "An offeree's proposal of different terms from those of the offer 
constitutes a counteroffer." Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 
1378 (Utah 1995); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d § 82. 
Frehner explicitly refused to enter into a contract based upon CAPCO's proposed 
Asphalt Sales Contract. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack, \ 5, attached hereto as Exhibit 
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A. After rejecting CAPCO's offer, Frehner extended a counteroffer in the form of its 
Bulk Purchase Order Form. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack, |^ 5, attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. CAPCO acknowledges that Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order Form constituted 
a counteroffer and that this counteroffer was valid in its brief, stating "Five weeks later, 
Frehner submitted its own form as a counteroffer." See Respondent's Brief, at 15. 
B. CAPCO Accepted Frehner's Counteroffer. 
In Utah, "An acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an 
objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable contract 
has been made." Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St, George, 898 P.2d at 1376. "An 
acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer...or it 
is a rejection of the offer." Id. "An acceptance may be implied from acts or conduct, and 
performance by the offeree of the promise requested may constitute an acceptance." See 
17AAm.Jur. 2d § 96. 
CAPCO expressly accepted Frehner's counteroffer. See Affidavit of Michael C. 
Pack, Tj 6, attached hereto as Exhibit A. CAPCO further manifested its acceptance by 
performing according to the terms of Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order Form. During the 
course of the Boulder Highway Project, the counteroffer governed payment and other 
practices to which the parties adhered. See Affidavit of Michael Pack, Tflj 9-12, attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. By performing according to the terms of Frehner's counteroffer, 
CAPCO clearly manifested its acceptance of the terms of that offer. 
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C. UCC § 2-20 7 Is Inapplicable Because Frehner Rejected CAPCO's Offer. 
CAPCO erroneously cites UCC § 2-207 (identical to UCA. § 70A-2-207 and NRS 
§ 104.2207) to argue that Frehner's counteroffer constituted an acceptance under the 
UCC with a disagreement as to the term for forum selection. UCC § 2-207 reads: 
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation, 
1. A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on 
assent to the additional or different terms. 
2. The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the 
contract unless: 
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of 
the offer; 
(b) They materially alter it; or 
(c) Notification of objection to them has already been 
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. 
3. Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a 
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of 
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of 
the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the 
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under 
any other provisions of this chapter. 
UCC §2-207. 
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Frehner's explicit rejection of C 41 *CO" s Asphalt Sales Contract precludes 
operation ol 1 M '<i ^ 2-211 ' midn ••ulv.n In > , m I 11 I H ili Snj ,» me ( 'innl I•.i-. .l.ili d 
"**' iddressi:- ' * - tiami...under § 70A-2-207(l), which relates to different or 
additional terms contained in an acceptance, it must first be determined whether an • 
underlying agreement...existed.'" Ih-rm Hughes & Sons, h it ". v. Quintek, ,v * . A >.. 
an elenientary scl 100I. I lughes delivered a ^ upplier's agreement to Quintek, but "Quintek 
refused to sign the supplier's agreement because ol material change frum its bid 
proposal" Id. a* 58 *. uumkk submitted a counteroffer to Hugnes. v. i.^n uujJies 
n . u . i ; ' • I I In ml 
no contract had been formed, thus UCA § 70A-2-207 did not apply. Id, at 584. 
The present case parallels Hughes. CAPCO extended an offer which Frehner 
expressly denied ,\u Allium » ,--\ >.,,,..^., .-.u . * . 1 ; ^ . . ^ : ; A ; . .1:-1 . :J . 
I;rr li in • 1 iht in I'NII ndti d n 1 niiiilnnf In ,SV< A Midas ih * ), attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. No agreement was reached until CAPCO accepted Frehner's 
counteroffer, thus UCC § 2-207 is inapplicable. 
D. £^p(jQ Cannot Argue Ren 
Frehner's Counteroffer, 
CAPCO cannot perform under the terms of the counteroffer and later argue that 
the terms do not apply whei 1 a dispute arises. The j Ttah Supreme Court has noted, 
"Eqi lily will not permit a part}' to accept p a lormaiKv .a*-
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the evidence, as a basis to substantiate an assertion of indefiniteness." Woolsey v. Brown, 
539 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 1975). Although Woolsey dealt with specific performance in 
a real estate dispute, the court's reasoning applies to the present situation. If CAPCO 
believed that the forum selection clause contained in the counteroffer was invalid, it 
should have stated so before it agreed to the terms and began performance. CAPCO 
cannot wait until a dispute arises to raise the issue of differing forum selection clauses 
withFrehner. 
E. Even If the UCCIs Applicable, CAPCO Dealt with Frehner in Bad Faith 
in Violation of UCC § 1-203. 
UCC § 1-203 states, "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation 
of good faith in its performance or enforcement." See UCC § 1-203, codified in Utah at 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 and codified in Nevada at NRS 104.1203. 
CAPCO is violating the UCC's good faith requirement by attempting to state 
retroactively that it did not agree to Frehner's forum selection clause. CAPCO cannot 
rely upon the UCC to govern the differences between the forms when those differences 
only arise due to CAPCO's failure to notify Frehner that it disputed the Bulk Purchase 
Order Form terms in violation of the UCC requirement to deal in good faith. If CAPCO 
disputed the forum selection clause in Frehner's counteroffer, it should not have accepted 
the counteroffer and it should not have performed its contractual duty. CAPCO cannot 
assert now that it did not assent to Frehner's forum selection clause, and therefore, a 
"battle of the forms" arises in which the prevailing clause is determined by the UCC. 
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If the Court were to accept CAI'CO's analysis ofthe i ,. .; . 
• • i .H * cpi CWt i > ', I, •'« "ii election clause. CAPCO agreed to Frehner's Bulk Purchase 
wiucrForm. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack. *• r attached hereto as Exhibit \ ^ 
performing its requirements under Frehner's Bulk I'm chase < )iuu i 'orn>. i An •,. vi 
that it accepted I leliiiei s u nnkToilei nu lmlim» (lit Iniiini i ( " I c v f t u i i 
CONCLUSIOI i 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be reversed. 
DATED this ( g j _ ^ " day of August. J - ~i 
SNOW CI IR IS FENSEN A" r 1 MM'INh AI I 
^ i L 
David W. Slaugl 
Jill L.\p>unyon ' 
Attorneys for Delendahtfe/Petitioners 1-rehncr 
Construction Co., Inc. and Safe Co. Insurance 
Company America 
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ADDENDUM 
Affidavit of Michael I . l\u I Exhibit A 
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Tab A 
DAVID W.SLAUGH H U ,l ISH HIVII) 
JILL L. DUNYON (USB# 5948) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
INTHETFilKw JUD1C1A 
STATE OF UTAH 
CROWN ASPHALT PRODUCTS AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL C. PACK 
COM P ANY a \ Tlah corporation, 
F ••!••••<- Civil No. 030922467 
vs. Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
I'REHNI.R CONSIRUCIK'IM ' 
a Nevada corporation and S At1 ECO 
INSURANCE C< »MAPNY OF AMERICA, 
a Washington *., .• -t;.' 
I 
STATE OF NFA • 
: ss. 
< ) 
I, Michael C. Pack, having first been duly sworn, deposes and says*. 
1. I am over the age of 21 and am otherwise competent to testify as a witness in this 
rnnlkT. 
2. I am the president of Frehner Construction Co, Inc. ("Frehner"). 
3. Frehner has been doing business with Crown Asphalt Products Company or its 
predecessors ("Crown") for approximately 20 years. Throughout that relationship, all Frehner's 
purchases of product from Crown have been under terms of Frehner's purchase order contracts, 
in form and content substantially the same as the Bulk Purchase Order involved in this litigation. 
4. Frehner rejected the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract which is the subject of 
this litigation. 
5. I informed Crown that Frehner would not sign Crown's proposed Asphalt Sales 
Contract. I also informed Crown that Crown was welcome to furnish product to Frehner, but that 
any Frehner purchase would be under the terms of Frehner's standard purchase order agreement, 
or not at all. 
6. Crown agreed that it would accept and furnish product for the Boulder Highway 
Project under Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order. Crown and Frehner understood at that time that 
Frehner would not sign Crown's Asphalt Sales Contract. Crown ultimately did furnish product 
for the Boulder Highway Project, some of which was rejected by the Nevada Department of 
Transportation for failure to comply with contract specifications. 
7. The Asphalt Sales Contract provided in conjunction with the Boulder Highway 
Project was never signed by Frehner. 
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8. On or about March 8, 2002, Frehner provided a Bulk Purchase Order to Crown, 
ordering the asphalt for the Boulder Highway Project. 
9. Crown delivered the Asphalt to the Boulder Highway Project during 2002, 
without a signed Asphalt Sales Contract, after notice from Frehner that it would not purchase 
product from Crown under such a contract, and after having received Frehner's Bulk Purchase 
Order. 
10. During the course of construction of the Boulder Highway Project, the parties did 
not adhere to the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract payment terms. Payment was made 
consistent with the terms of Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order with no objection from Crown. 
11. During the course of construction of the Boulder Highway Project Frehner did not 
provide to Crown scheduling information and "contacts in writing" as required by the Asphalt 
Sales Contract, with no objection from Crown. 
12. Although the Bulk Purchase Order was not signed by Crown, it was the document 
under which the parties were operating on the Boulder Highway Project. The Bulk Purchase 
Order governed payment and other practices of the parties. Although Crown alleges in its 
Complaint that the Asphalt Sales Contract was the controlling document, the parties did not 
operate under the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract and the parties had expressly agreed to 
conduct business under the Bulk Purchase Order. 
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*tA DATED this /y 4ay of November, 2003 
MICHAEL C. PACK 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me This /¥__ day of November. 2003 is A/% 
"NOTARYFUBUC 
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STATE OF NEVADA 
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A. KATHLEEN CRAFTi 
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